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Who are the targets of familial electoral coercion? Evidence from Turkey 
 
ABSTRACT: The unfettered expression of electoral choice is an important democratic right; 
however in many contexts voters are pressured by others to cast their votes in certain ways. 
Electoral coercion is a topic that has received increased attention from researchers in recent 
years as part of the wave of research on electoral violence, yet there is little consensus in the 
literature as to who the targets of coercion are most likely to be. This paper uses a list 
experiment embedded in a survey fielded following the Turkish general election of 2018 to 
identify the targets of coercive electoral practices within families and among close friends. 
The analysis reveals familial electoral coercion to be strongly conditioned by partisanship and 
disadvantaged demographic characteristics, but finds no evidence that women are more likely 
than men to be coerced. 
 
Freedom of electoral expression and ballot secrecy are fundamental requirements of electoral 
integrity; only when voters are able to express their genuine electoral preferences safe from 
outside influence can their votes be said to be cast in a truly democratic manner. Yet too 
commonly the free expression of electoral preferences is undermined by coercive practices 
through which voters are pressured to opt for particular electoral choices, on pain of sanctions 
specified or imagined. Electoral intimidation is a phenomenon that has gained increasing 
attention from researchers in recent years; however most studies of this topic rely on macro-
level data to discern overall causal patterns. Analysis of the micro-dynamics of electoral 
coercion is an important research objective, as the fear or experience of unwanted pressure 
can fundamentally alter voter orientation toward electoral processes.  
Electoral coercion is often described as ‘undue influence’. There are numerous ways 
in which the voter’s choice can be influenced. Some of these are perfectly legitimate, as, for 
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example, when a voter learns about a candidate’s position on an issue through a campaign 
advertisement or a conversation at the family dinner table and decides to vote for the 
candidate on this basis. Influences that are ‘undue’ include a range of particularistic practices: 
vote-buying, violence and coercion. There has been extensive recent research on vote-
buying,
i
 but only a limited amount on voter coercion, which is the focus of this paper. 
Pressure exercised by family members and close friends is undeniably a violation of 
freedom of expression. Though there is nothing problematic in one family member seeking 
electoral advice from another,
ii
 active efforts by family members or friends to induce others 
to falsify their true preferences are another matter. Sometimes, such pressure can even be 
accomplished by violations of ballot secrecy in which polling officials collude. The 
Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections published by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) details the problem in these terms: “The 
principle of secrecy of the vote requires that election regulations underline that secret voting 
is not only a right on the part of the voter but an absolute obligation. In this regard the most 
frequent abuse is ‘family voting’, which is still a relatively common practice in many OSCE 
countries. The legislation should make clear that every voter’s ballot must be marked and cast 
secretly. Election officials should under no circumstances accept deviations from the 
principle of secrecy of the vote”.
iii
 When pressure is used to try to sway the vote of fellow 
family members or close friends, that choice can no longer be considered to be free. We term 
this phenomenon ‘familial electoral coercion’. 
Growing concern in the international electoral assistance community about violence 
against women during elections has led to an increased interest in familial electoral coercion 
and the related phenomena of family and proxy voting.
iv
 Coercion within the family has been 
identified by practitioners in a wide variety of contexts. Collating election observer reports 
and ethnographic evidence, Schaffer presents evidence of family voting from 46 countries, 
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including new and established democracies as well as electoral authoritarian states.
v
 Though 
the material collected by Schaffer does not for the most part include concrete evidence of 
coercion, the prevalence of collective voting in violation of the legal and normative 
requirements of democracy does suggest that this practice serves a specific political function 
rather than simply being the result of ignorance or negligence.
vi
 In contexts as diverse as 
Niger, Gabon, Macedonia, Israel, China, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Papua New Guinea, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Uganda, 
Greece, France and Turkey, the evidence assembled by Schaffer suggests a clear intent by the 
head of family to usurp the vote choice of other family members.
vii
 Recent identification of 
familial electoral coercion as a problem among Bangldeshi- and Pakistani-heritage 




Despite abundant anecdotal evidence of familial voter coercion from election 
monitoring reports and other practitioner documents, there has to date been little systematic 
empirical research on the correlates of this practice. In this study we employ data from a list 
experiment embedded in a survey carried out by the authors at the time of the 2018 Turkish 
elections to refine our understanding of which sectors of the electorate are vulnerable to 
electoral coercion by family members and close friends. The Turkish elections of 2018 are an 
ideal context in which to examine this phenomenon, as these were high-stakes contests in a 
clientelistic political setting where traditional family structures are still common and electoral 
violence of various types is on the rise as democratic norms erode. The experimental 
evidence points to partisanship and disadvantaged status as being core drivers of vulnerability 
to familial electoral coercion. Interestingly, gender is not a correlate of susceptibility to 
coercion, once other factors are controlled. 
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This analysis makes important contributions to several areas of political science. Most 
obviously it helps develop the emerging sub-fields of electoral malpractice and electoral 
violence by identifying and characterizing an important but previously understudied type of 
coercive malpractice. The investigation undertaken here is also relevant to the study of 
electoral behaviour, and the role of social context in conditioning vote choice. Finally, the 
findings will be of interest to students of Turkish and Middle Eastern politics, as they 
contribute a piece to the puzzle of electoral competition in semi-authoritarian contexts. 
The following section draws on the literatures on clientelism and electoral violence to 
set out theoretical expectations about the drivers of familial electoral coercion. The next 
section details the data we employ and the methods we use. The third section of the paper 
presents and analyses our results, while a final section discusses the results and concludes. 
 
1. Theoretical perspectives on familial electoral coercion 
Voter coercion is a common form of electoral manipulation that can be understood in terms 
of broad tendencies in particularistic vote mobilization, including clientelism which often 
takes coercive forms.
ix
 Although the literatures on electoral violence and coercion detail the 
various ways in which political actors seek to manipulate voters,
x
 research on electoral 
coercion within the household has been scarce. In a rare example of academic work in this 
area, Schaffer proposes a classification that conceptualized two types of familial voter 
coercion: “controlled voting” (the dictating of women’s and younger men’s vote choices by 
senior male household members) and “split voting” (the deliberate allocation of a family’s 
votes across two or more candidates).
xi
 Though the Schaffer article breaks new ground in 
establishing familial voter coercion as a topic of scholarly enquiry, the author admits that the 
dearth of systematic empirical evidence of the phenomenon precludes detailed analysis, and 
he calls for “more focused and systematic attention” to be devoted to the topic.
xii
 This paper 
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responds to Schaffer’s call by seeking to theorize and assess the types of voters most likely to 
be vulnerable to familial voter coercion. 
The importance of free, secret and uncoerced electoral choice is set out clearly in 
international law, which establishes the basic requisites of democratic elections. According to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, elections must be (1) held periodically, (2) by secret ballot, (3) under 
universal and equal suffrage, (4) in a non-discriminatory manner, (5) allowing direct choice 
and (6) free expression.
xiii
 These requirements can be divided into those that pertain to the 
electoral process (periodic, direct elections), who is allowed to vote and how electoral 
procedures are administered (equal suffrage and non-discrimination), and the conditions 
under which individual vote choice is made. Ballot secrecy and free expression are aspects of 
the final category.  
In order to explore the dynamics of voter coercion, we can draw on the findings of 
research on particularistic electoral strategies. Several studies show that ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ particularism have many similarities
xiv
 and there is considerable evidence from the 
study of clientelism that parties engaging in targeted appeals of this nature focus on specific 
types of voter.  
There are two principal dimensions of voter targeting: political and demographic. The 
political character of targeted voters is not well established in previous research. In a review 
of the literature on clientelism, Stokes finds that for the most part, swing voters are targeted 
by clientelist appeals.
xv
 In as much as the threat of violent coercion is, like the positive 
inducement of vote-buying, a particularistic approach, we may expect swing voters to be the 
target of coercion also. Papers by Robinson and Torvik and Collier and Vicente employ 
formal modelling techniques to predict that swing and weakly-aligned voters should be more 
susceptive to coercion.
xvi
 Chaturvedi, however, uses formal modelling to argue that the high 
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numbers of undecided voters should be associated with less pre-electoral violence.
xvii
 These 
contrary predictions have been tested in a limited number of empirical studies, some of which 
suggest that solid party supporters are likely to be the targets of violence, designed either to 
suppress voting or to alter vote choice,
xviii
 and some of which indicate that swing and weakly-
aligned voters are more likely to be targeted.
xix
 Thus, like the theoretical literature, the 
empirical literature yields inconclusive results on the political correlates of vote targeting. 
The demographics of voter coercion have also been the subject of several previous 
studies. Some comparative research suggests that the least privileged in society are most 
likely to be the targets of coercive strategies. In the African context, Mares and Young find 
that the poor are more likely to be victims of electoral intimidation.
xx
 Bratton finds that in 
Nigeria the least educated are most commonly affected by voter intimidation.
xxi
 González 
Ocantos and colleagues find that poor and rural voters are more likely to be targeted with 
intimidation than with vote buying in Guatemala.
xxii
  However, Dercon and Gutiérrez-
Romero find that urban voters in Kenyan are more frequently victims of electoral violence 
than their rural counterparts.
xxiii
 As with the literature on the political complexion of targeted 
voters, research on their demographic characteristics offers inconclusive results. 
There is also a small body of work on workplace coercion, which is typically 
economic rather than physical.
xxiv
 Though coercion by employers can be expected to operate 
through channels that differ from those of coercion by family members and close friends with 
whom one is linked by emotional bonds, both take place in a context that is not overtly 
electoral. This literature also finds economically vulnerable voters to be more often 
targeted
xxv
 but finds no gender effect.
xxvi
 
Despite the conflicting findings from existing studies of the targets of electoral 
violence and coercion, existing studies provide hints that can help us to develop hypotheses 
about familial voter coercion. With regard to the role of partisanship, one might expect it to 
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be more difficult to convince strong partisans to alter their preferred vote; if a person does not 
have a strong electoral preference – or potentially has never even developed electoral 
preferences at all, given the absence of need in the presence of strong patriarchal electoral 
pressure – it stands to reason that the vote choice of such an individual will be more labile 
than that of a staunch party supporter. Though some studies of electoral violence have found 
strong partisans to be more likely targets, this is generally because (a) they are less 
susceptible to alternative vote-altering techniques such as vote-buying, and (b) physical 
violence is typically employed to keep them from voting altogether. There are reasons to 
believe that both causal mechanisms will be weaker within households. In as much as intra-
family transfers of money and other objects of value have little meaning in the context of 
shared household budgets, vote-buying within the family is an unlikely strategy. Moreover, 
within the home there are typically limits to the level of coercive force that is likely to be 
employed against fellow family members for electoral ends, and outright physical attacks are 
typically less common than the deployment of emotional and psychological pressure.  
A further factor worth considering is that known partisans are more likely to come 
under pressure from political elites to ‘deliver’ the votes of family members. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that there can in some contexts be a strong link between coercive 
clientelism within the family and clientelism that operates between family units and political 
parties;
xxvii
 in other words, heads of household first secure guarantees that family members 
will vote in a particular manner, and they then deliver those votes en bloc to the party of their 
choice (or the party that is most threatening). Family voting and familial voter coercion can 
thus be expected to form part of a larger economy of clientelism that is most likely to engage 
partisans. 




H1: Voters with weak party identification will be more likely to experience familial voter 
coercion. 
 
The literature cited above strongly suggests that economic insecurity should make a 
person more susceptible to electoral coercion. In the household context there are two aspects 
to this: economic dependence within the family unit and the economic dependence of the 
family. Within the family, lack of economic independence often leads subordinate family 
members with little choice but to bow to electoral pressure in exchange for ongoing economic 
security; faced with the choice of expressing their true partisan pressure at the ballot box and 
continuing to enjoy the economic benefits of full family membership, it is not difficult to 
deduce that many electors will opt for the former.
xxviii
 It follows that the more economically 
dependent family members are on other members of the same family unit, the more likely 
they are to fall victim to familial electoral coercion. Furthermore, women are more likely than 
men to be in subordinate economic positions. For this reason, women and less educated 
family members can be expected to be more vulnerable to familial electoral coercion. 
 At the level of the family, poorer and less educated families are generally more likely 
to be dependent on clientelist ties due to need and lack of alternative income sources.
xxix
 This 
means that heads of poorer and less educated families are more likely to feel pressure to 
deliver votes en bloc and therefore have greater incentive to employ familial electoral 
coercion.  
 Taken together, these aspects of family and social organization suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Respondents with disadvantaged demographic characteristics will be more 
likely to experience familial voter coercion, specifically:  
H2a: Respondents with lower education levels will be more likely to experience coercion 
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H2b: Women will be more likely to experience coercion 
H2c: People with lower household income levels will be more likely to experience coercion 
H2d: People from less developed regions will be more likely to experience coercion 
 
2. The 2018 Turkish Context 
For several reasons, Schaffer’s category of “controlled voting” fits the Turkish case of 
familial electoral coercion well. Since the establishment of the Turkish multiparty system in 
1946, kinship and family background have been decisive factors in shaping vote choice; 
moreover, Turkish household members in rural areas have historically tended to act as 
instructed by the head of the family, seldom making their own decisions.
xxx
 Tradition-
oriented families led by patriarchs were typically rewarded in return for their support with a 
wide range of administrative positions where they could sustain and reproduce traditional 
power relations within the new multiparty system.
xxxi
  
In more recent years, this rural type of clientelism has been transformed in to a urban 
form where political parties and party leaders are motivated by the desire for the power, 
income, and prestige that accrue to those who gain and hold political office.
xxxii
 In this 
context, material inducements and preferential administrative treatment are exchanged for 
votes.
xxxiii
 As political institutionalization and democratic consolidation faltered in Turkey, 
political patronage and clientelism became integral components of Turkish politics.
xxxiv
  
In all such clientelist practices, it is possible to see potential coercive motives, 
particularly at the family level. Recent research on the subject has demonstrated that the 35 
percent of voters were targets of vote buying,
xxxv
 and family leaders play a key role in the 
negotiation of exchanges of goods and services for votes.  These findings are also supported 
by several other reports of incidents of electoral violence at the household level. For example, 
the OSCE report on the 2007 Turkish elections stated that: “In rural areas, and some urban 
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areas, women’s dependency on male family members is often high. This can at times be 
reflected in the manner of voting, in particular where women are challenged by high levels of 
illiteracy, and family voting reportedly remains a common practice in some areas”.
xxxvi
 The 
OSCE’s report on the June 2015 parliamentary elections notes “alleged offences, including 
related to photographing filled in ballots, family voting, directed voting, multiple voting […]” 
that were condoned by polling officials.
xxxvii
  
Efforts have been made by state authorities to curb this practice. In 2008, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court annulled a provision that would have allowed postal voting on the 
grounds that the secrecy of voting via postal ballot could not guaranteed, and violations of 
secrecy could leave voters vulnerable to undue influence by family members.
xxxviii
 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem persists. In recent years there 
have been reports of women who were forced to take pictures of their votes to prove that they 
had voted for particular candidates/parties;
xxxix
 elderly male family members voting on behalf 
of other members of the family;
xl
 and the obstruction of voting by women.
xli
 
 Turkish voters have recently had ample opportunity to experience electoral coercion. 
By the end of 2018, Turkey had held a total of seven elections in five years, including three 
parliamentary elections (two in 2015 and one in 2018), two presidential elections (2014 and 
2018) a constitutional referendum (2017) and local elections (2014). Over the course of this 
‘electoral storm’, electoral integrity came under the spotlight. Though the country has 
regularly held competitive multiparty elections for several decades, concerns about the 
quality of elections have increased; these include allegations of fraud, undue influence and 
violence that cast doubt on Turkey’s claim to be an established democracy;
xlii
 These concerns 
reached a climax at the time of the 2018 combined presidential and parliamentary election, 
which the Economist described as “the most unfair election in Turkey in decades”.
xliii
 The 
2018 elections took place after a short but tense campaigning period, but more importantly, 
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under the state of emergency (SoE) rule, which was set after the July 2016 coup attempt. This 
situation raised serious concerns about the integrity of the 2018 elections, since the SoE 
measures affected the judiciary, the police, the military, the civil service, local authorities, 
academia, the media and the business community, shutting down over 1,000 institutions and 
private companies and seizing their assets.
xliv
 The United Nations (UN) raised similar 
concerns noting that “protracted restrictions on the human rights to freedom of expression, 
assembly and association are incompatible with the conduct of a credible electoral 
process”.
xlv
 While the government maintained that the election was transparent, the 
atmosphere was hardly conducive to a level playing field, considering the opposition’s 
limited access to the media and state resources.
xlvi
 Confirming these concerns, the 2018 
OSCE election observation mission recorded evidence of violations of electoral procedure, 
limitations on media freedom, intimidation and numerous violent attacks on candidates and 
partisans.
xlvii
 All of these developments follow from the state of exception which appears as 
“a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism”
xlviii
 and which makes the 
Turkish context an ideal one in which to probe the correlates of familial voter coercion. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
The contrary findings on the correlates of electoral coercion noted above may well be partly 
accounted for by contextual variation, but they may also be due to the fact that many of the 
studies cited rely on direct reports by citizens to survey researchers, and answers to direct 
questions about experience of coercion may themselves be affected by distrust and fear. It is 
for this reason that we employed a list experiment to tap concerns about electoral coercion, as 
list experiments enable researchers to gauge respondent concern indirectly. 
For this purpose, data was collected via a nationwide representative face-to-face 
sample survey in July 2018, immediately following the June 2018 presidential and 
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parliamentary elections. The achieved sample was 1,232 with a response rate of 24 percent. 
Embedded in this survey was a list experiment designed to measure personal respondent 
experiences of familial voter coercion. List experiments, where respondents respond with the 
number of items on a list that corresponds to their experience but refrain from identifying 
specific items, are unobtrusive methods that are often used to measure participation in or 
experience of sensitive topics
xlix
 including voter coercion in Russia
l
 and vote-buying in 
Turkey.
li
 Accordingly, our unobtrusive measure of familial voter coercion is based on the 
random assignment of respondents to different groups. In our survey, one group of 
respondents is randomly assigned to the control condition in which they are presented with a 
list of factors that shape the voting decision and asked to indicate how many have been 
influential in the voting decision, but not which, of the items shape their decision. Another 
randomly selected group of respondents is given the same list of items, but with the addition 
of one item measuring the familial electoral coercion, forming the treatment group. Again, 
the respondents are asked to indicate how many, but not which, of the items shape their 
voting decision. Because the respondents are instructed not to disclose the items shape their 
voting decision, the interviewer has no way of knowing whether any particular respondent is 
facing familial electoral coercion. In that structure, even though, there is no way of knowing 
whether an individual is subjected to familial electoral coercion, the same is not true for the 
respondents as a group. Indeed, by comparing the average number of voting decision items in 
the control and treatment groups, we can ascertain the proportion of respondents who 
experienced coercion. For example, if the average number items in the control group is 1, and 
the average number in the treatment condition is 1.5, then the estimate for the proportion of 
respondents that face familial electoral coercion would be 50 per cent. Going one step further, 
we also employ the technique offered by Blair and Imai in order to explore the relationships 
between respondents’ characteristics and their answers to our sensitive item.
lii
 Their method 
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moves beyond the above-mentioned difference-in-means analysis by developing new 
multivariate regression estimators under various designs of list experiments. Hence their 
methodology provides researchers with essential tools to efficiently examine who is more 
likely to answer sensitive items affirmatively and which respondents are likely to answer 
sensitive questions differently, depending on whether asked directly or indirectly through a 
list experiment.  
 
The wording of our list experiment is as follows: 
Q: The choices of voters for voting a particular party or candidate are shaped by a 
number of factors. Now I will read some of these factors. We are curious about 
which factors actually shaped your decision. Please do not tell me which ones, 
just tell me only how many.  
 
I voted for the particular party or candidate because … 
 
Control group: 
1 It is time to change the administration 
2 I liked the pledges of party and/or candidate 
3 I want stability in administration 
 
Treatment group: 
1 It is time to change the administration 
2 I liked the pledges of party and/or candidate 
3 I want stability in administration 
4 Someone close forced me to vote for that specific party or candidate (sensitive 
item) 
 
All respondents also answered the following direct question about personal experiences of 
electoral coercion: “Did someone close, like somebody from work or family, force you to 
vote for a specific party or candidate?” Respondents were also asked a range of questions 
designed to tap partisanship and demographic characteristics. The question wording for 





The results of the list experiment indicate that voter coercion is relatively common in Turkey, 
and that list experiments are a useful way of measuring it. 
 




The first two rows in Table 1 show the difference in the number of items identified by 
the control group, who were not shown a list with coercion on it, and the treatment group, 
who were presented with a list including coercion. As the first column of Table 1 suggests, 
when asked directly, 7.22 percent of the respondents stated that they have been forced to vote 
for a specific party or candidate. Then we have calculated the mean for responses in the 
control and treatment groups which are 1.78 and 1.98 respectively. The difference in group 
averages falls between zero and one, and it represents the proportion of treatment group 
respondents who (indirectly) answered affirmatively to the sensitive familial voter coercion 
question. Thus, the estimated proportion of voters who have been subjected to familial voter 
coercion according to the list experiment is 20 percent, and the difference between control 
and treatment groups is significant at the .01 level. The figures in the final row of Table 1 
indicate that there is a 12.78 percent difference in experience of voter coercion between those 
in the first group who were given the direct question and those in the second group who were 
given the list experiment, confirming that the list experiment was in this context an effective 
means of revealing sensitive information. This is an important finding for those who use 
survey research to probe electoral integrity, as it suggests that direct questions will not always 
result in accurate responses, and it confirms the utility of list experiments in this context. 
Figure 1 presents this difference graphically. 
 





The hypotheses set out above delineate two sets of expectations about the factors that 
might make an individual likely to experience voter coercion: strength of partisanship and 
disadvantaged demographic characteristics. The strong and weak party identification 
variables are coded as dummy variables by recoding a four-point closeness thermometer: 
responses of 1 or 2 on this scale are coded as 1 while responses 3 and 4 are coded as 0, 
representing strong and weak party identifications respectively. These hypotheses are tested 




Recall that our first hypothesis is that voters with weaker partisanship levels are more 
likely to experience coercion designed to make them vote for a particular party. Given that 
the role of partisanship may be expected to vary by party, the analysis is broken down into 
two component parts. Figure 2 presents the coefficient plots of a regression models of 
partisans of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) 
party (coefficients for weak and strong partisans are shown here; the baseline category is non-
support for this party); the model designated by solid lines is that based on the list experiment 
results; the model designated with dashed lines is based on the results of the direct question. 
Figure 3 presents analogous coefficient plots for the models of partisanship for the main 
opposition party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party, CHP).
liv
 In the 
AKP models, the coefficient for weak partisanship is positive and highly significant in the list 
experiment model (though not the direct question model), indicating that weak AKP partisans 
were especially vulnerable to familial electoral coercion (controlling for education, income, 
region and strong partisanship). The coefficients for strong AKP partisanship are not 
significant in either model. In the CHP models, the partisanship coefficients are not 
significant at all. These results provide partial support for H1. They indicate that familial 
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electoral coercion is most pronounced among partisans of the ruling AKP party, and that its 
strongest effects are exerted on weak partisans, as expected. Consideration of the current 
political context in Turkey can help us to make sense of these findings. The AKP’s tight grip 
on power affords it with political leverage not available to the CHP (or other political 
parties). In the current context of rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey,
lv
 party 
pressure of this type plays a plausible role in elections; this interpretation is commensurate 
with literature that views authoritarian backsliding in Turkey and elsewhere in terms of subtle 
manipulation by elites of electoral and other democratic institutions.
lvi
 If the AKP puts 
pressure on known supporters to vote by intimidating them or otherwise signaling 
expectations to heads of family, the threat of consequences for non-compliance may well be 
perceived as being serious. The perceived danger of not delivering votes in the requested 
manner may well induce heads of household to pressure family members and close friends 
into voting for the party. That the effect should be more pronounced for weak partisans 
accords with the expectation that those with weaker partisan links should be more vulnerable 
to targeting. Previous research has shown strong AKP supporters to be more susceptible than 
adherents of other parties to vote-buying;
lvii
 it could be that this party employs a carrot-and-
stick approach found elsewhere,
lviii
 using the carrot of vote-buying with strong supporters and 
the stick of coercion with those more weakly alinged to its core aims.  
 
Figure 2 About Here 
Figure 3 About Here 
 
Our second hypothesis was that respondents with disadvantaged demographic 
characteristics should be more likely to experience familial voter coercion. In the Turkish 
context, this includes those with lower education levels, women, people in households with 
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lower incomes and those living in the less developed regions of East and South-east Anatolia. 
The models presented in Figures 2 and 3 provide evidence of the expected effect of education 
and region, but not income or gender. Those with lower education levels and those living in 
East and South East Anatolia are more vulnerable than others to familial electoral coercion; 
both coefficients are highly significant in the more robust list experiment models. Moreover, 
partisanship does not appear to affect the role of these variables, which are significant in both 
the AKP and the CHP models. However, it could be that demographic effects are to some 
extent obscured by partisanship, which is closer in the funnel of causality to the dependent 
variable. We therefore ran a set of models with partisanship omitted (see Figure 4). Again, 
education and region are significant, but gender and household income are not. 
 
Figure 4 About Here 
 
As noted above, we expect to observe different causal pathways in relation to different party 
identifications, such that the effects will be brought most clearly into relief in models 
focusing on the impact of adherence to the different parties separately. As a robustness check, 
we have presented combined models including identifications with all parties (Appendix 2 in 
the Supplementary Material). As might be expected, the effects are weaker in these models, 
but still evident and significant at the .10 level. 
Given the emphasis in the practitioner literature on familial electoral coercion on 
women as victims, and the strong link in the clientelism literature on poverty and 
vulnerability to clientelist ties, these are interesting and somewhat unexpected findings.
lix
 It 
could well be that familial electoral coercion affects less developed regions but not 
necessarily poorer households within those regions. If this is the case, regional culture may 
mediate propensity to engage in this practice rather than objective economic need. The strong 
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effect of education confirms the cultural interpretation; more educated individuals (and 
households) may be more likely to understand and to accept democratic norms of vote 
secrecy and independent choice; more educated individuals are also less likely to find 
themselves in need of electoral assistance due to illiteracy. It could thus be that the 
commonly-held vulnerability of women to familial electoral coercion is in fact due to their 
typically lower levels of education, rather than to their gender per se. An alternative 
explanation is that female family members may be less likely than male family members to 
experience directed voting as unwelcome pressure, as they may less often have formed 
autonomous electoral preferences due to lower levels of political engagement. Detailed 
consideration of these alternative explanations awaits future research. 
 
2. Discussion and Conclusion 
Familial electoral coercion represents a substantial threat to free elections, and as such it 
touches on the core values of democracy. Though the broad outlines of familial electoral 
coercion have been known for some time, there has to date been scant systematic empirical 
analysis of this phenomenon, for the simple reason that the data to test it have not previously 
been available. Given that vulnerability to coercion is a sensitive question, and given that 
many survey respondents answer surveys in the presence of other family members (Schaffer, 
2014), traditional survey items asking people directly about their experience of coercion in 
the home are unlikely to provide robust data. The list experiment technique employed here 
overcomes this problem by affording an unobtrusive means of measuring voter coercion 
within the home. The micro-data collected in the context of the fraught Turkish election of 
2018 allow us to undertake the first systematic empirical analysis of this phenomenon. The 
findings indicate that this form of electoral misconduct is a major problem in Turkey: 
approximately one in five voters experience pressure to vote a certain way from other family 
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members or close friends. Vulnerability to this practice appears to be greatest among, weak 
partisans of the ruling AKP party, among less educated sectors of the electorate, and among 
those residing in the less developed regions of East and South-east Anatolia. Contrary to 
expectations, women and people living in poorer households are not more likely to 
experience this type of pressure, once other factors are controlled.  
 These findings have clear relevance to the international community of electoral 
practitioners. The prevalence of familial electoral coercion in Turkey should be a wake-up 
call to those seeking to secure democratic practices in the Turkish context. The lack of a 
distinct gender profile to those who experience electoral pressure from fellow family 
members should also make practitioners rethink the problem, which may be as much a 
function of education as it is of gender per se.
lx
 Considering the broader clientelist context in 
which this phenomenon most commonly emerges, this stands to reason. If a head of 
household needs to deliver a certain number of votes to a given political party, it makes little 
difference if those votes come from male or female family members. This suggests that it 
may make more sense to view familial electoral coercion as an educational issue than a 
gender issue, a possibility that merits consideration in future analyses. 
 This paper also suggests a number of other avenues for future research. Familial voter 
coercion is a violation of the norms of democracy, including equal rights and autonomous 
decision-making. Practices such as this contribute to informal economies of clientelist vote 
mobilization. Future work could usefully explore in greater depth the link between coercion 
within the family and coercion of the family, in order to confirm (or disprove) the supposition 
that family members who engage in this practice are doing so at the behest of political 
patrons. Moreover, when the regional component is concerned, in line with the theoretical 
arguments we have presented above, the vulnerability of weakly aligned voters may also be 
fuelled with the severe SoE practices in the region, which may constitute an interesting 
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extension of this study.  Relatedly, the identity of perpetrators of familial electoral coercion 
would be a useful topic on which to gather data, as the analysis of perpetrator-victim dyads 
would shed more light on the phenomenon than can be gleaned from consideration of victims 
alone. Finally, it would be of interest to know what practical measures are effective in 
intervening to prevent voter coercion within the family. This paper has gone some way 
toward opening up systematic empirical analysis of an understudied topic of investigation; it 
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Supplementary Material [online] 
Appendix 1: Survey Question Wording and Variable Construction 
Dependent variables:  
 
Experience of familial electoral coercion: direct question: 
 
Did someone close, like somebody from work or family, force you to vote for a 
specific party or candidate? 
 
Experience of familial electoral coercion: list experiment question: 
 
The choices of voters for voting a particular party or candidate are shaped by a 
number of factors. Now I will read some of these factors. We are curious about which 
factors actually shaped your decision. Please do not tell me which ones, just tell me 
only how many.  
 
I voted for the particular party or candidate because … 
 
Control group: 
1. It is time to change the administration 
2. I liked the pledges of party and/or candidate 
3. I want stability in administration 
 
Treatment group: 
1. It is time to change the administration 
2. I liked the pledges of party and/or candidate 
3. I want stability in administration 




Which political party do you feel most close? 
 
1. Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
2. Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
3. People’s Democracy Party (HDP) 
4. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
5. IYI Party 
90-Other 
99-Do not know/No answer 
 
How close do you feel to the each of the following political parties? Please indicate under the 
options of  
 
1- Not at all close  
2- Not quite close 
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3- A bit close 
4- Very close 
90-Other 
99-Do not know/No answer 
 
Education: 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
1- Illiterate 
2- Literate, not graduated from a school 
3- Primary school (5 years) 
4- Middle school (or Primary Education School – 8 years) 
5- High school or equivalent 
6- School of higher education (2 years) 
7- University (at least 4 years) 
8- Graduate school 
9- Other 
10- No answer 
 
Income 
Can you please tell me which range best describes your total monthly household income? 
 
1 0 - 500 TL 
2 501 - 1.000 TL 
3 1.001 - 1.500 TL 
4 1.501 - 2.000 TL 
5 2.001 – 2.500 TL 
6 2.501- 3.000 TL 
7 3.001- 3.500 TL 
8 3.501 - 4.000 TL 
9 4.001 TL and higher 
99 No answer 
 
The construction of the partisanship variable was a two-step process. First the respondents 
were asked if they have any party that they feel close to. Then as the second step the indicator 
for partisanship variable was constructed based on combining the middle two levels of the 
following survey item “How close do you feel to this party?” by excluding strong (full 
alignment) and no-relationship (full dealignment) categories. The final variable codes weak 
alignment as “1” and others as “0”. The region variable was constructed by combining East, 
South East and North East Anatolian and the remaining regions under the codes of “1” and 
“0” respectively. Education variable is created by rearranging the original education question 
into the two levels of high (1) and low (0), using the secondary education level as the 
threshold. Similarly, the income variable was constructed by regrouping the intervals of 
income as high (1) and low (0), using the middle category as the threshold.  
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Appendix: Regression Tables  
Party Based Models  
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